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CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660. By Bradley 
Chapin. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 
203. $18. 
The process by which the common law of England was received 
by American jurisdictions has long been a matter of dispute among 
legal historians. 1 While there seems to be a consensus that English 
precedent did not come to dominate American law until after the 
American Revolution,2 the early period of colonial law, from initial 
colonization until the influx of English lawyers and heightened royal 
interest,3 still sheds important light on the "transfer and transforma-
tion of common law in its American setting."4 It is here that Bradley 
Chapin's book, Criminal Justice in Colonial America, 1606-1660, be-
gins to fill what has been described as a glaring gap in American 
legal history.5 
Chapin's work is apparently the first thorough survey of the 
criminal law in all of the original colonial jurisdictions.6 Recent ef-
1. For a thorough examination of the reception issue, see J. GoEBEL & T.R. NAUGHTON, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-
1776) (1944); Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF 
EARLY AMERICAN LAW 53 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). 
2. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 1, at 71-72, 74-75; Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the 
Making of American Law, 48 AM. L. REv. 676-82 (1912); Reinsch, The English Common Law in 
the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367 
(1907). 
3. The development in the colonies of a legal profession in the latter half of the seven-
teenth century produced growing reliance on the English common law, which was familiar to 
contemporary legal practitioners. Concurrently, the crown began to assert more control over 
the colonies as their strategic importance in the mercantile structure became more apparent. 
See Flaherty,An Introduction to Early American Legal History, in EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF 
EARLY AMERICAN LAW 3-4, 15-16 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). 
4. Billings, Law in Colonial America: The Reassessment of Early Legal History (Book Re-
view), 81 MICH. L. REv. 953, 954 (1983). 
5. A major inadequacy of extant studies of the history of American law in the seven-
teenth century is the absence of studies that compare the colonies with the mother country 
and one colony with another. At the present time such an approach to the study of legal 
history would appear to have great possibilities. Such undertakings may well do away 
with the traditional lament about having to study thirteen separate jurisdictions, for in 
colony after colony the historian is often much more impressed with the similarities than 
the differences. The distinctions between colonies exist, of course, but even they have not 
been explained or described except in the broadest terms. The uniqueness of the New 
England Puritans' reforms of English law can be questioned, for example, once one has 
examined the legal records of seventeenth-century Virginia. 
Flaherty, supra note 3, at 13 (footnote omitted). 
6. Much of the work in this area has focused on only one jurisdiction or region. See, e.g., 
J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 1; Hilkey, Legal .Developments in Colonial Massachu-
setts, 1631-1686, XXVII COLUMBIA STUDIES IN HISTORY ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC LAW 
(1910). Other works have focused on much narrower issues. See, e.g., C. KARRAKER, Ti:iE 
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SHERIFF: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SHERIFF IN ENGLAND 
AND THE CHESAPEAKE COLONIES, 1607-1689 (1930). For an extensive review of the literature 
on early American law, see Flaherty, supra note 3. 
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forts in the resurgent field of legal history7 have been characterized 
by close scrutiny of primary sources, 8 and Chapin follows this lead, 
drawing heavily on the records of legislative and judicial proceed-
ings. His book is obviously the product of a comprehensive and 
thoughtful consideration of these sources. The author has identified 
dozens of noteworthy cases and has amassed empirical data concern-
ing the occurrence of crime and the sources of colonial law and 
procedure. 
Chapin uses this information to review four major facets of colo-
nial criminal justice: the substantive criminal law, the judicial pro-
cess it entailed, the courts and officials involved in its administration, 
and the nature of colonial crime. He examines the colonial jurisdic-
tions9 individually and with reference to geographic and demo-
graphic groups. He then compares the results of these analyses with 
parallel developments in the English common law. 
Chapin devotes systematic attention to each facet of the colonial 
criminal justice system. For example, the chapter on judicial pro-
ceedings progresses from arrest to post-conviction relief, much like 
any modem criminal procedure casebook. Within this highly struc-
tured survey format, Chapin integrates the work of other legal his-
torians with illuminating anecdotal digressions. Accounts of cases 
involving crimes such as homicide, bestiality and witchcraft 10 trans-
form what might otherwise be a dry, specialized study to one with 
more general appeal. 
Chapin also considers the early struggle between discretionary 
justice and the strict rule of positive law, a theme often discussed in 
works on colonial American law. 11 Initially, the colonies inherited 
the common law principle of legal explication by judicial usage 
rather than statutory enactment (p. 15). Chapin notes that by 1660 
the New England colonies, 12 at least in the area of criminal law, had 
7. The resurgence began in the late sixties and early seventies. Billings, supra note 4, at 953 
n.I. 
8. The long neglect of primary sources is discussed in Haskins, Law and Colonial Society, 
in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 41 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). 
9. There were seven initial jurisdictions: Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Mary-
land, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Haven. 
IO. For example, Chapin details the plight of George Spencer, who was accused of bestial-
ity. Pp. 38-39, 128-29. Spencer, who had only one eye, was accused of impregnating a sow 
that had given birth to a hideously deformed, one-eyed piglet. P. 128. The explicitness of the 
official record verges on the macabre and, viewed from a modem perspective, is an absurd 
indictment of Puritan naivete. Chapin quotes the official record to illustrate that bestiality was 
prosecuted out of a simplistic fear of half human, half animal "monsters," p. 128, as well as out 
of moral indignation. 
11. For a presentation of a variety of issues customarily addressed in works on colonial 
law, see EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW (D. Flaherty ed. 1969) and LAW 
AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA (G. Billias ed. 1965). 
12. Chapin often groups colonies together in a north/south dichotomy, referring to the 
New England Colonies and the Chesapeake Colonies. 
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shifted to a predominantly statutory system. Chapin attributes the 
shift primarily to opposition to "discretionary" justice (p. 19). In 
contrast to their northern counterparts, the Chesapeake colonies ad-
hered to a discretionary, non-codified system, a choice which Chapin 
attributes to political and demographic differences, as well as the ab-
sence of a strong ideological base upon which to build a code -
something the New England colonies had found in the example of 
Moses (p. 22). 
Chapin seems offended by those who would dismiss the early co-
lonial criminal justice system as primitive. In addition to the suc-
cessful shift toward simplified codes of law, he points to the relative 
success of reform in the colonies as evidence of sophistication. A 
primary example is opposition to the death penalty (pp. 55-58). 
Capital punishment was the norm for felony convictions in England, 
but in the colonies the death penalty was mandated only for murder 
and treason. The death penalty was virtually abolished for property 
crimes (p. 8) and was replaced by lesser corporal punishments. Cha-
pin attributes the success of colonial reform to a lack of political and 
legal obstacles, an ability to respond to problems in a more prag-
matic manner, and the greater value placed on life where labor was 
at a premium. 
The underlying advantage of Chapin's work is that it sheds more 
light on the process of reception. He refutes both the orthodox view 
of early legal scholarship, which held that reception was an incident 
of initial colonization, 13 and ''the frontier thesis, that beast of all 
American historical burdens" (p. 145), which characterized colonial 
law as "rude, untechnical popular law,"14 influenced by English and 
13. This theory was espoused by two of the preeminent jurists of the nineteenth century, 
Justice Story and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw. See Chafee, supra note 1, at 61-64. It holds that 
reception can be inferred from the language of several of the original colonial charters. For 
example, the Massachusetts Bay Charter 1628-1629 says: 
That it shall ••. be lawfull .•. in any of their Generall Courts •.. from tyme to tyme to 
make, ordeine, and establishe all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, !awes, 
statutes, and ordinances, directions, and instructions not contrarie to the !awes of this our 
realm of England, . . • and the forme of oathes warrantable by the !awes and statutes of 
this our realme of England • • . and for impositions of lawful fynes, mulcts, imprison-
ment, or other lawfull correction, according to the course of other corporations in this our 
realme of England . . . . 
Chafee, supra note 1, at 57. But see Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth 
Century New England, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 85-86 (D. Fla-
herty ed. 1969) ("In the last analysis the charter provisions are significant only as to the rela-
tions of a particular colony with the homeland, and cannot be regarded as constituting a 
reliable guide to what in fact transpired in America.") (footnote omitted). 
14. Reinsch, supra note 2, at 370, quoted in Chafee, supra note 1, at 65. Hilkey, see note 6 
supra, and Reinsch were· the major proponents of this view of reception. See Chafee, supra 
note 1, at 64-66. In the context of his study, Chapin characterizes this view of a primitive 
colonial law as "fantastic," p. 146, citing the success of reform and the move toward simplified 
codification of the criminal law in the colonies during this period. See text following note 11 
supra. 
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Biblical law, but essentially a product of unrefined invention. He 
concludes: 
Ifwe are to understand law development in America before 1660, we 
need to abandon the noun "reception" and replace it with the verb 
"carry." Emigrating Englishmen brought the law in their baggage. As 
immigrants always have, they left some of their possessions behind and 
would use some of what they carried with them for different purposes 
than had been intended. The law that colonists installed in the new 
jurisdictions was the result of conscious choice. The process of select-
ing from the old materials showed an awareness of the duality of the 
common law. [P. 146]. 
In the sense that Chapin has successfully undertaken the exten-
sive comparative analysis needed in a project of this sort, his work is 
both ambitious and ground-breaking. Much of the work in this area 
has focused on only one jurisdiction or region. 15 He has embraced 
the difficult task of collecting and analyzing the primary sources, 16 
and has made a conscious effort to avoid a problem that plagues 
scholarly research on colonial America - neglect of the southern 
colonies.17 Chapin's work, however, is by no means flawless. Survey 
work, by its very nature, tends toward generalization. . 
For example, Chapin often illustrates points with quotations 
from primary sources. While this method may be both revealing 
and persuasive, it is not necessarily authoritative, for at best the 
records reveal only an approximation of what really happened. Co-
lonial records were seldom "kept in a fashion that allows reconstruc-
tion of what they recall with mathematical precision.'~18 
Similar criticisms can be directed toward some of Chapin's at-
tempts at quap.tification. In an effort to make a large amount of em-
pirical data manageable, he reduces it to chart form. The success of 
this technique varies greatly depending on the type of information 
being processed. For example, a chart detailing all of the known 
witchcraft trials prior to 1660 (pp. 118-19) works well, displaying a 
large volume of essentially objective data in an accessible manner. 
On the other hand, the charts devoted to the sources of colonial law 
and the mode of expression (judicial versus legislative) (pp. 181-85), 
though informative, tend to be misleading. For example, when not-
ing the sources of the substantive criminal law, Chapin concludes 
that 56.5% derives from English common law, 25.1 % from indige-
nous sources, and 18.4% from the Bible (p. 5). Chapin concedes that 
his assignment of percentage values is arbitrary but contends that his 
figures are a fair representation (p. 181). Nevertheless, they suggest 
15. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text. 
16. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
17. See Billings, supra note 4, at 954. 
18. Id at 961. 
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mathematical precision that cannot fairly be ascribed to subjective 
considerations, particularly in a work relying on largely unverifiable 
records that are hundreds of years old. 
Ultimately, Chapin's work - essentially an exposition of what 
the law was - is in some respects subject to the criticism that it, like 
other studies of the colonial period, has over-emphasized institutions 
and origins.19 Yet Chapin has produced a highly informative survey 
of colonial criminal justice. Along the way he uses this survey to 
support his own observations about the reception of the common 
law. Chapin deserves much credit for surpassing so many of the lim-
itations of previous works; a book such as this is necessary before 
broader concerns can be addressed.20 As a foundation upon which 
past works may be evaluated and future work constructed, Criminal 
Justice in Colonial America is a complete and concise reference work 
of great value. 
19. While these [origins and institutional] studies are important matters, they should not 
constitute the boundaries of legal history to the detriment of more broadly conceived 
studies. Professor Stanley N. Katz has recently criticized the traditional character of even 
the more recent work in American legal history, which has continued to abide by old-
fashioned notions about periodization and has focused on a limited range of source 
materials. Katz emphasizes the need to study law broadly and to turn our concern from 
what law was to how law worked. 
Flaherty, supra note 3, at 33 (footnote omitted). 
20. One must begin the study oflegal history by posing the right kinds of questions. For 
what apparent or underlying reasons were certain legislative acts enacted? How did these 
statutes reflect the basic values of the society? To what extent did legislatures abandon 
control to the forces of inertia in a particular area? On what broad principles were cases 
being decided in the courts? Did the laws and the judicial decisions reflect the dominant 
forces at work in the society? To what extent did these new laws or decisions reflect 
changes in a developing society? Such crucial questions overlap many areas of historical 
specialization and an up-to-date legal history can 4J.tegrate them into a coherent whole. If 
the tasks of legal history are construed broadly enough and the correct questions posed, 
the history of American law can be a major area of historical investigation and will con-
tribute substantially to an understanding of the history of an era. 
See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 33. 
